After the introduction of a ‘humanitarian ceasefire’ in late November 2022 between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army, the political landscape in Arakan (Rakhine State) came to reach a relatively stable phase compared to other parts of the country. Consequently, the local population could have a chance to enjoy the liberalisation of trade, transportation, medical supplies and some other essential needs. But this situation did not last long when an ‘extremely severe cyclone’ known as ‘Mocha’ or ‘Mokha’, named after a Red Sea port city in Yemen, struck the coast of Arakan in western Myanmar with wind gusts of over 200 kilometres per hour (195 mph) on 14 May lunchtime (around 11 AM to 1 PM).
Accurate data and statistics are still difficult to find. But the key cities and townships that fell along the cyclone path and bowed to the destruction are Sittwe, Rathedaung, Ponnagyun, Pauktaw, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Myebon. The impact on other neighbouring townships was relatively low. But, in historic and geographic terms, the main areas affected are the heart of Arakan civilisation and the backbone of political and economic power situated along the Kaladan valley. A large majority of the Arakan population lives in these areas, and these are the places in which armed conflicts have been the most intensive and extensive during wartime.
In reality, the full destructive impact of the cyclone is yet to be counted. In line with UNOCHA data of 16 May, up to 5.4 million people are expected to have been in the cyclone path, including Arakan and other northwest areas of Myanmar, including Chin State and the Magway and Sagaing Regions. Among those hit, nearly 3.2 million are targeted as the most vulnerable with a likely scenario of humanitarian needs. The UNOCHA summary, however, has not clearly detailed the specific populations in each area, including Arakan.
On the same day, the Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO), a branch established by the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), released a flash point in which the number of cyclone-affected people in Arakan is estimated to be around 1.5 million. In addition, the HDCO said that more than 400,000 buildings (including hospitals, schools and other public infrastructure) are partially or completely destroyed, including Internal Displacement Person (IDP) camps in several townships.
Amidst these estimates, the information regarding the number of casualties is still changing, including deaths, injuries and disappearances, and there are different opinions about the reported deaths of around 400 Rohingya people in Sittwe township. The junta authorities, for instance, stated on 19 May that the news of such a number was a fake one and that the total number of deaths in Rakhine State as of 18 May was only 145, including 117 from the Rohingya community. In addition, the statement claimed that the fatalities were those who did not follow the instructions and evacuation plans of the authorities, and that they therefore have no responsibility for what happened, warning media groups to change their reports.
In contrast, the National Unity Government (NUG) and its Rohingya representative, Mr Aung Kyaw Moe, and many others from the Rohingya community claimed that the number of reported deaths is real and would possibly be more if accurate information is allowed with the restoration of proper communication channels. In an interview with the Narinjara TV news on 18 May, Aung Kyaw Moe remarked:
“The key reason why there are more deaths in the junta-controlled areas compared to the ULA-controlled ones is about the difference in political will between the two authorities in handling the evacuation and preparedness for Cyclone Mocha.”
Recalling the Pre-Cyclone Scenarios
On record, the recent Cyclone Mocha is considered the fourteenth since the late 19th century but the most destructive to strike the Arakan coast. According to the Indian Meteorological Department, the cyclone was expected to become a depression on 9 May and then changed into ‘Cyclone Mocha’ on 10 May. Only two days later, on 12 May, it was forecast that the direction of the storm would approach the shores of Chittagong in Bangladesh and Arakan in Myanmar. Then, two days later, the storm struck along the path between the towns of Sittwe and Rathedaung on the Arakan coast.
In response to this threat, the activities of early warning and preparedness by the ULA authorities began on 7 May. In subsequent days, the ULA’s Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office released several ‘do and don’t lists’ in both on the ground and online public spaces. On 13 May, one day before the storm, a spokesperson said that the ULA had already evacuated around 102,000 people from townships in the projected path and asked the international community to keep an eye on the cyclone progress.
It was the military junta, however, who tried to hinder early warning actions by the ULA authorities. For instance, it was reported in Zinchaung village, Kyaukphyu township, that a group of ten soldiers destroyed the HDCO’s cyclone awareness-raising posters on 9 May. In addition, the early warning approaches of the junta were procedural but non-substantive in their outcomes. Although there were regular broadcasts on state-owned television and update-sharing on its ‘weather forecast’ Facebook page, the outreach of regime-controlled channels was not effective for people living in rural areas and the languages used were also difficult for local communities to understand.
The key loophole in the junta’s disaster evacuation planning can be found in the case of mass deaths among the Rohingya population near Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State. In this case, the junta authorities claimed that they had made an effort to evacuate around 63,000 people, and that the dead people were those who had declined to follow their instructions. In contrast, community leaders and Rohingya activists claimed that the regime did not carry out sufficient preparations, leaving many people to die. Until the present, there are different data and conflicting narratives between the junta authorities and Rohingya community leaders on this issue.
Apart from the administrations of the junta and ULA, the UNOCHA released some awareness-raising posters and videos on its ‘Facebook page’ on 11 and 12 May. But these efforts, though welcome, still had limited impact. On 12 May, the UNOCHA again stated that they were preparing for the upcoming cyclone and, more importantly, ‘engagement with all relevant stakeholders’. Then, one day before the cyclone strike, the same Facebook page claimed that the World Food Programme (WFP) had already allocated ‘sufficient food’ for around 400,000 people for both Rakhine State and neighbouring regions in the following month.
On the same day when the cyclone struck Arakan, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Rama Balakrishnan stated that they had done everything they could but that accessibility to the affected populations and increased funding were now critical. A different narrative, however, has been presented by a prominent charity worker in Sittwe who said that they had made an effort to reach out to the WFP for food preparation before the cyclone but that the WFP had told them to contact the agency only through the junta’s authority. Then, when local aid groups contacted regime officials, the latter told them that helping the people who were affected by the cyclone was up to the WFP’s availability. The charity worker also added that, up until the present day, there is a ‘volleyball game’ playing between the junta and WFP despite the disaster-affected communities being in dire humanitarian need.
The situation remains deeply troubling. Although updated reports continue about humanitarian provision by some international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), the territories and amount of population being provided for are very limited, and they are restricted to only urban and suburban areas which constitute less than 10 per cent of the afflicted communities.